State Supreme Court opens door to common law claims for owners of vehicles that may have been wrongly seized by police.
With a 6-3 decision, the Washington Supreme Court has ruled that motorists who believe their vehicles were wrongly seized can pursue common law claims to seek compensation.
The class action lawsuit (Potter v. Washington State Patrol) tested the state’s argument that people whose cars were seized for driving with a suspended license, or other offenses for which seizure is authorized, can only seek recourse in the courts under Washington’s towing and impoundment statute (RCW 46.55). The statute lays out a set of procedures and costs by which owners can recover their vehicles or challenge whether their cars or trucks or motorcycles were properly impounded. The law also lays out the process for how a seized vehicle can be auctioned off, and the proceeds distributed between the towing company and the state motor vehicle fund.
The Washington State Patrol’s argument in the case was that the statute is the exclusive remedy for people who believe a seizure was unwarranted.
But today the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the legislature did not clearly intend to
cancel out and preclude common law tort claims arising under what is known as “conversion”–the act of usurping another person’s ownership in a way that unjustly deprives him/her of the rights or value of ownership. Thus, while a car owner can make use of the remedies in the towing and impoundment law, he/she can also choose to opt out of the statutory process and bring a common law claim seeking damages for unjustified seizure.
“The WSP argues the statute contains language of exclusivity,” wrote Justice Mary Fairhurst, for the majority. “But by its plain language, the statute applies only to redemption. ‘Vehicles…that are impounded by registered tow truck operators…may be redeemed only under the following circumstances.’ RCW 46.55.120 creates a statutory right of redemption by which an impounded vehicle may be reclaimed by paying all towing, removal, and storage fees. A statutory right of redemption is a distinct and separate remedy from common law action of conversion. In essence, redemption is a right, generally created by statute, to regain possession of property that is lawfully in another’s possession. In contrast, conversion is a common law tort action to recover the fair market value of property that is unjustifiably possessed by another. Thus, the statute provides a procedure by which a vehicle owner can regain possession of his or her vehicle. It does not, on its face, apply to instances where a vehicle has already been sold at an auction and the previous owner is seeking damages for the value of the vehicle rather than repossession.”
Later in her opinion, Justice Fairhurst elaborated on how the court saw that the rights of vehicle owners (at least those whose vehicles are unjustly taken from them) were constrained under the state statute, relative to the rights they could exercise under common law.
“The redemption statute does not provide adequate or comprehensive relief for the conversion of a vehicle for a number of reasons,” she wrote. “First, while good faith limits the liability of the impounding agency under the statute, good faith is not a defense to conversion. Thus, if a conversion action is brought following a DWLS [driving with license suspended] impoundment, loss of use damages would be available under the common law, but not under the statute, assuming a good faith reliance on driving records. Second, for people who do not attempt to, or are unable to, redeem their vehicles, the remedy is even more inadequate. Once a vehicle is sold at an auction, the owner has the right to claim any surplus proceeds for up to one year. Under conversion, the owner would receive the fair market value of the vehicle. The auction value of a car, after satisfaction of a tow truck operator’s lien, is an inadequate remedy when compared to the fair market value of the vehicle. In short, the inadequacy of the remedy provided by the redemption statute is evidence that the legislature did not intend the statute to be the exclusive remedy for an unlawful impoundment.”
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